C. S. Lewis' Critique of Naturalism in That Hideous Strength by Daley, Timothy Joseph
C. 9. _!.ewis' Critique of 
Naturalism in That 
Hideous §_trength 
By 
TIMOTHY JOSEPH DALEY 
II 
Bachelor of Science 
University of Tulsa 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 
1974 
bubmitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 







C. S. Lewis' Critique of 






C. S. Lewis was a prolific and versatile author who 
wrote popular theology, literary criticism, and children's 
books, as well as science fiction. As a young man he was 
a professed atheist, but was challenged in his non-belief 
by reading George MacDonald's Phantastes, G. K. Chesterton's 
The Everlasting Man, and the philosophy of Henri Bergson. 
Lewis became interested in Christianity through his associ-
ation with J. R. R. Tolkien and his own study of St. Augus-
tine, The Imitation of Christ, and Luther's Theologica 
Germanica. Later he was profoundly influenced by Aquinas' 
Summa and came to admire the works of Buber, Marcel, Mari-
tain, and Berdyaev, along with Rudolf Otto's The Idea of 
the Holy. 
Though he was a committed rationalist he believed that 
the highest theological truths could only be understood 
imaginatively, not rationally. And so he exploited litera-
ture's capacity to accomplish that undertaking. Because 
Lewis became convinced of the philosophically untenable na-
ture of atheism and was sickened by the direction of modern-
ity he attempted to provide an alternative vision through 
his imaginative literature. This effort is nowhere more 
evident than in That Hideous Strength, a visionary, apoca-
lyptic novel, written during World War II. It is perhaps 
iii 
Lewis' most forceful attack on the abuses of modernism and 
the philosophical bulwark of naturalism that sustains it. 
This doctrine holds, in Lewis' view, "that only nature--the 
whole interlocked system--exists,•• 1 and it is the operative 
underlying belief of the evil forces centered 1n Belbury, 
hell bent on the perversion of Nature. Only the small band 
of Christians clustered at St. Anne's can stop them. That 
confrontation constitutes the structural drama of the work. 
Lewis held that good literature must perform as a spir-
itual aid or tool for saying what needed to be said, and 
that it should always be committed to the pursuit of moral 
truth. For him imaginative writings serve not only as a 
creative outlet but also bring home to the reader inner 
truths in a much more forceful way than can either philo-
sophical or historical forms. Today That Hideous Strength 
can still be enjoyed and contemplated for its revelations 
about the nature of man and the inexplicable ways in which 
the powers of good and evil work through him. The kind of 
characters who inhabit Belbury, their intentions, and the 
dramatic situations which arise all serve to underscore the 
meaning of naturalism and the implications of its long-term 
use. 
For their help 1n my effort I would like to thank Dr. 
Janemarie Luecke and Dr. Ed Lawry. I am deeply grateful to 
my teacher and friend, Dr. David S. Berkeley, who suggested 
Lewis to me and gave me many good ideas along with helpful 
suggestions for revision. I extend a special thanks to Dr. 
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Gordon Weaver, department chairman, for kindly granting me 
more than one extension on the paper. For their fine lec-
tures and discussions on naturalism I would like to thank 
Mr. Gil Ring and Dr. David Denz of the philosophy department 
at St. Meinrad College. Finally, I am indebted to my loyal 
friends and family without whose encouragement and patience 
I would have abandoned the whole bloody project long ago. 
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C. S. Lewis' Critique of 
Naturalism in That 
Hideous Strength 
"For philosophy to rule," wrote Ortega y Gasset, "it is 
sufficient for it to exist; that is to say, for the philoso-
pers to be philosophers. For nearly a century past, philo-
sophers have been everything but that--politicians, peda-
gogues, men of letters, and men of science." 2 The abdica-
tion by philosophers of their traditional teaching role has 
been a product of, and a contribution tq, the general state 
of disarray in contemporary society. They no longer profess 
to have any insight into the timeless questions which have 
always confronted and confounded humanity. What has speci-
fically been abandoned is the traditional philosophy of 
Western Europe which was rooted in the belief in a transcen-
dent order of reality which contained the pre-eminent values 
of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty mediated to us through ethics, 
logic and aesthetics. According to C. E. M. Joad it is be-
cause 
the universe is--or contains--a moral order that 
some things are right and some wrong; true and 
false; beautiful and ugly. Most philosophers 
would have added that there is a deity and that 
2 
deity is the source of value--Goodness, Truth, and 
Beauty being the modes of God's revelation of Him-
self to man. Metaphysics, being the study of the 
reality whi.ch underlies and transcends the famil-
iar world, is, therefore, in part, the study of 
those values and of God. 3 
In other words this view provided both a principle to live 
by and a purpose to live for--for over two thousand years. 
Morality is the principle, and the increase of what is good, 
beautiful, and true is the purpose. However, this is no 
longer the lesson being taught and the result, according to 
most Christian philosophers, has been disastrous. 
that 
The Catholic existentialist Gabriel Marcel reflected 
It can never be too strongly emphasized that the 
crisis which Western man is undergoing today is a 
metaphysical one; there is probably no more dan-
gerous illusion than that of imagining that some 
readjustment of social or institutional conditions 
could suffice of itself to appease a contemporary 
sense of disquiet which rises, in fact, from the 
very depths of man's being. 4 
Humankind has fallen; triviality has triumphed. There are 
no challengers in sight. Today philosophy is, by and large, 
an academic, professionalized discipline entrenched in 
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political and sociological thought. It apes the sciences in 
its focus on rigor and precision and in its specialization. 
The major schools of thought either deny or are deeply sus-
picious of traditional philosophy and the questions it exam-
ined, opting instead for the study of logical constructions, 
the activities of science, and interesting esoteric problems 
. h . 5 1n mat emat1cs. If something cannot be verified or measured 
it does not exist. To a large extent the discipline of 
theology has also succumbed to the scientific method--leav-
ing many believers puzzled or indignant. Inevitably these 
doctrines are expressed 1n public policy. As a result, 
Christian thinkers like C. S. Lewis are alarmed at the moral 
crisis facing contemporary Western civilization--evidenced 
by its subjective nihilism and technocratic barbarism. 
It was Lewis' deep conviction that a sound political 
order must be based on a very definite view of human destiny: 
the Christian view. And since Christianity was being dis-
carded, the proper basis of politics was being undermined. 
Lewis nowhere demonstrates this belief more forcefully than 
in his realistic/fantasy novel, That Hideous Strength. In 
it he fearlessly confronts the tragedy that awaits humanity 
if it does not return to his natural recognition of his de-
pendency on God. Lewis believed that this self-imposed es-
trangement led to the fragmentation of society and the in-
dividual persons, leaving them vulnerable to the whims of 
mass society's growing dependence on the state and its sci-
entific techniques. The first tendency he perceived was a 
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grow1ng exaltation of the collective coupled with a growing 
indifference to persons. The second tendency was the notion 
of remaking humanity in the name of science, which seems to 
offer freedom, but will only bring bondage. In his "Reply 
to Professor Haldane," Lewis said that "under modern condi-
tions any effective invitation to hell will certainly appear 
in the guise of scientific planning--as Hitler's regime in 
fact did." 6 This is precisely what takes place in the nov-
el--the tension focusing on the N.I.C.E. 's (National Insti-
tute for Coordinated Experiment's) diabolical plot to en-
slave both Nature and mankind, eradicate belief 1n God and 
an ordered universe, and elevate a selected few individuals 
to the throne of the universe. Its members, however, are 
merely Satan's unwitting dupes and because their treachery 
is of cosmic proportions, the Powers, representing God and 
Maleldil must intervene via the human forces at St. Anne's, 
who are devoted to goodness in their battle to overthrow 
Satan. Wither, Feverstone, Frost, Straik, and Hardcastle 
constitute the high command at the N.I.C.E. who seek the 
clairvoyant powers of Jane Studdock to assist them in their 
search for Merlin, the druidical wizard of Logres, whose by 
now neutral "dark powers" may be of some use to them. To 
get Jane, however, they entice and entrap her gullible, am-
bitious husband, Mark. Jane, in the meantime, has been wel-
corned into the household at St. Anne's, headed by Elwin 
Ransom, the philologist/space traveler of Out of the Silent 
Planet and Perelandra, who now directs the household's 
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counterattack on Belbury. Grace Ironwood leads Jane to the 
Head, Dr. Ransom, and hence to her salvation. Ivy Maggs, 
the Dimbles, the Dennistons, and MacPhee round out the group. 
They, too, are very interested in finding Merlin, whose pl-
votal role in the drama constitutes the mythical aspect of 
the story. 
The novel is also realistic in its psychological ap-
proach to Mark and Jane Studdock, both disgruntled young 
people in search of fulfillment. But while Jane is fortu-
nate enough to place herself on the path to wisdom and truth 
early on, her fatuous husband Mark seeks admittance into the 
inner rings of the Progressive Element at Bracton College 
and the N.I.C.E. It takes Mark an almost interminable amount 
of time to discover the cynical depravity of Belbury and ex-
tricate himself from it in the nick of time. His confusion, 
however, appears to be a widespread condition today, in 
Lewis' view. 
The novel testifies that on the surface level of human 
life exist two essential factors which are mutually influen-
tial--ideology and technique. Each person confronts life 
with certain basic convictions about what the world and each 
person's place in it are. Additionally, each person finds 
himself in surroundings which include more or less technical 
skill or control over the material environment. The scien-
tifically oriented doctrine of naturalism has had a major 
effect on people's lives today and Lewis fears for the fu-
ture because of its growing acceptance. Many critics 
recognize the expression of those fears in Lewis' devastat-
ing critique of naturalism which permeates That Hideous 
7 Strength. No one, however, has adequately examined the 
structure of his critique. With this paper I intend to de-
fine naturalism in Lewis' terms, and then show how he con-
6 
fronted it. Because he believed this philosophy to be bank-
rupt both intellectually and morally he labored to expose 
its inconsistencies as well as its fearful implications. 
How he accomplishes this project will be the subject of my 
paper. 
To begin with, naturalism is the product of various 
other "isms,'' some of which are quite old: materialism, me-
chanism, and empiricism (called positivism today). Materi-
alism considers the basic things in space and time to be 
micro-entities or a combination of micro-entities; every 
event or occurrence is either the movement of a micro-entity 
or some combination of them. It is pluralistic in that it 
denies that these entities are parts of some more basic re-
ality. According to materialists human beings are aggre-
gates of those micro-entities, so that in theory a person 
lacks substantial unity or ~elf-hood. Reality is material-
ity and nothing else. Hence the reductive nature of materi-
alism denies the reality of a spiritual nature in humanity 
and holds that consciousness is simply a brain process, com-
pletely material, or at best, a non-material activity of the 
body. Mind, then, is only the latest product of the evolu-
tion of matter. In the eyes of the N.I.C.E. that process 
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must continue indefinitely--for them the mind is immanent. 
According to their delusion the "chosen Heads" are the "next 
step in evolution." 8 Obviously, though, the N.I.C.E. is not 
restricted simply to this materialistic conception of power. 
It must be bolstered by a doctrine of determinism, which, if 
applied universally, people cannot be held morally respon-
sible for their actions--if people are merely the product of 
an endless chain of causes and conditions, such things as 
praise or punishment would be meaningless. 
This belief is enthusiastically embraced by mechanism, 
which holds that all natural processes are solely the result 
of purposeless causes and do not tend toward goals or ends. 
The denial of teleology, then, is the cornerstone of mechan-
ism. It is the equivalent of denying that there are agents 
in nature--a canard that Professor Fros~ was fond of recit-
ing to Mark Studdock as he underwent his "training" in ob-
jectivity. The notion is to distrust thinking--only seeing 
and measuring can provide undeniable truth. 
This distrust of thought by mechanists is shared by the 
advocates of logical positivism. This philosophy, according 
to Professor Joad, "denies the existence of first principles, 
repudiates metaphysics, and holds that all of our knowledge 
comes to us through experience, by which it means sense--ex-
perience."9 Obviously, then, there can be no transcendent 
reality--at least if there is, we can have no knowledge of 
it. Because all metaphysical assertions are deemed meaning-
less, any ethical judgments are seen to be merely emotive--
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they are used to express feelings about certain objects but 
not to make any assertion about them. As Frost explains 
it: "Resentment and fear are both chemical phenomena. Our 
reactions to one another are chemical phenomena. Social 
relations are chemical relations. You must observe these 
feelings in yourself in an objective manner" (p. 313). For 
the positivist all propositions are either empirical or 
tautologous. The implication is that values cannot be 
known--cruelty is, theoretically, just as a&eeptable as 
benevolence. This theory induces a thoroughgoing scepticism 
which Lewis attacked in The Abolition of Man--the book that 
laid the groundwork for That Hideous Stren3th. In it he 
wrote, "if nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved; 
similarly, if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, noth-
ing is obligatory at all." 1° From the innocence of subjec-
tivism will come the disease that "will certainly end our 
species (and in my view, damn our souls) if it is not 
ll 
crushed." For according to traditional realistic philo-
sophy the notion that humanity can create their own system 
of values is absurd. Yet that is what we are left with ac-
cording to this doctrine; we see the attempt being made by 
the N.I.C.E. to realize that their goal, and their employ-
ment of any and all theories to justify it. 
One of their favorites, though somewhat underplayed by 
Lewis, is the quasi-religjous philosophy that has been en-
tertained over the past two hundred years known as Vitalism 
or emergent evolutionism. Its advocate in the novel is 
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Reverend Straik, who stresses the real teaching of the "here 
and now Jesus." Cast by Lewis as a bitter apostate Straik 
posits finality without final causes--maintaining that na-
ture by some immanent power, force, or elan tends toward 
certain ends, but that no external cause directs or moves 
it. Thus, he, like all vitalists, is committed to the prop-
osition that the total cause of the dynamics of nature is 
to be found within nature itself. This concept can be ex-
ploited by naturalism to legitimate its own ends because, as 
Lewis writes in Miracles, 
Such a God would not stand outside Nature or the 
total system,·would not be existing ''on his own." 
It would still be "the whole show'' which was the 
basic Fact, and such a God would merely be one of 
the things (even if he were the most interesting) 
which the basic Fact contained. What Naturalism 
cannot accept is the idea of a God who stands out-
"d d d . 12 Sl e Nature an rna e lt. 
This type of nature-religion also exploits the concept of 
development--takes the increasing complexity of organic, 
social, and industrial life--and makes it a god. Lewis ar-
gues that it is essentially atheistic. 
In its purest form naturalism embodies all of the pre-
ceding dogmas. Its esse~tial feature is the proposition 
that all natural processes are to be explained only by natu-
ral processes. In other words, it takes nature to be the 
whole of reality with all things and occurrences completely 
interconnected within the total system. There is no room 
for the concept of free will under those conditions, as 
Lewis points out, because 
10 
free will would mean that human beings have the 
power of independent action, the power of doing 
something more or other than what was involved by 
the total series of events. And any such separate 
power of originating events is what the Naturalist 
denies. Spontaneity, originality, action "on its 
own," is a privilege reserved for "the whole show," 
which he calls Nature. 13 
What bolsters this exclusivity is the notion that if some-
thing cannot be studied by science it does not exist. Con-
sequently, it would be irrational to believe in a supernatu-
ral reality. Lewis, on the other hand, argues that our ra-
tionality is, itself, beyond nat~re because nature is power-
less to produce rational thought. For Lewis every human 
mind has its taproot in an infinite, all-knowing being we 
call God, who is also the source of all value. But for the 
naturalist, value is a natural phenomenon and not something 
that can exist apart from the natural, or human, situation. 
This is to deny the absoluteness of values. The terms "good" 
and ''bad" would apply only in specific situations, which is 
to say that they are without general application. 
The relativity of values grows out of naturalism's 
ll 
pragmatic interpretation of knowledge which holds that the 
truth of a belief is not based on a correspondence between 
that belief and reality, but on the fruitfulness that the be-
lief produces when used as a principle of action. Thus an 
idea is true when the thinker acts and attains the desired 
result, and false when the action is not followed by the de-
sired result. 
Phenomenologist Walter Stace accurately describes the 
worldview which begins to emerge from the preceding: 
The world, according to this new picture, is pur-
poseless, senseless, meaningless. Nature is noth-
ing but matter in motion. The motions of matter 
are governed, not by any purpose, but by blind 
forces and laws. It is this which has killed re-
ligion. . If the scheme of things is purpose-
less and meaningless, then the life of man is pur-
poseless and meaningless too. Everything is fu-
tile, all effort is in the end worthless. Hence 
the dissatisfied, disillusioned, restless, spirit 
14 
of modern man. 
Lewis believed that this lO$S of faith would inevitably lead 
to a grossly mutilated and distorted view of humankind's true 
nature. Only by rediscovering our absolute dependency on God 
can we regain our equilibrium. Lewis was fond of saying that 
he recommended Christianity not because it was good for 
people, but because it was true. In it he saw the best, most 
12 
consistent explanation for reality. He attacked naturalism 
because it was both pernicious and false. Next I will exam-
ine his exposure of naturalism's inconsistencies--a strategy 
which he satirically employs throughout the novel to show 
that it is virtually impossible for the naturalist to con-
sistently maintain his philosophy. 15 He accomplishes this 
end by his overall depiction of the ambiguous nature of Bel-
bury and by implying the empirical, self-referential, and 
logical inconsistencies in its views and actions. 
The appearance and structure of the N.I.C.E. ("nyce" 
in Middle English means "foolish") serve as a comprehensive 
symbol of the speciousness of naturalism. A perpetual shroud 
of dense fog masks the innocuous-looking buildings. Dotting 
the labyrinthine corridors inside are chattering, faceless 
androids who seem to lack any certain direction. The infra-
structure of the organization exudes a tone of ambiguity, and 
although communications are somewhat erratic, there is a di-
rect line of authority emanating from the Deputy Director, 
Wither, through Feverstone and Fairy Hardcastle, down to the 
amorphous glob of technocratic toadies. Above all, the or-
ganization prides itself on its "elasticity" and its "fluid-
ity." Wither does not like to be pinned down or make things 
clear. The very nature of the enterprise is, on the whole, 
very elusive--at least superficially. 
Inside the Blood Transfusion Office Lewis donates an-
other metaphor--the Objective Room. Mark's appraisal of it 
suggests Lewis' view of naturalism: an empty room with no 
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windows, artificially lighted, giving the illusion of day-
light. It was chilly and ill-proportioned; too high and too 
narrow, with a lopsided doorway. 
the analogy: 
Lewis cleverly prolongs 
The thing was near enough to the true to deceive 
you for a moment and to go on teasing the mind 
even after the deception had been unmasked. In-
voluntarily one kept on shifting the head to find 
positions from which it would look right after 
all. (p. 367) 
Even the pattern of spots on the ceiling suggested some kind 
of regularity, but the suggestion was ultimately frustrated, 
resulting in their peculiar ugliness. Apparently ordinary 
pictures on the walls revealed subtle vulgarities. The 
whole experience was designed for Mark's first lesson in "ob-
jectivity"--"the process whereby all specifically human re-
actions were killed in a man so that he might become fit for 
the fastidious society of the Macrobes" (p. 369). That that 
capacity had already been eradicated in Wither and Frost is 
nowhere better demonstrated than in their inability to re-
cognize the tramp as an ordinary, common man (though a little 
down on his luck). Lewis had great sport with this situation 
as he ironically bedecked the tramp in the robes of a Doctor 
of Philosophy and later had him identified by Jules as a 
''sonambulist chimpanzee." These are just some of the obvious 
ways in which Lewis derides the naturalist worldview. There 
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are others. 
In contrast with the members of St. Anne's who radiate 
warmth and depth the automatons at the N.I.C.E. are flat, one-
dimensional caricatures. Wither, whose very name suggests 
decrepitude, is described as being a spectre, a "shapeless 
ruin," who possesses the uncanny ability to be in several 
different places at once. His human essence is buried some-
where inside the shell he presents to the world. But, where-
as Wither enjoys a certain degree of omnipresence, Mark is 
primarily preoccupied with staying out of sight--and for ob-
vious reasons. Most of the staff's existence is only im-
plied, for they burrow themselves in their anonymous offices 
for the most part--their fate sealed. Mark on the other hand 
is grasping for some kind of identity, but invariably that 
gift is denied him. Lewis implies that identity is something 
shaped from within; it is not bestowed on an individual per-
son by anyone else. And so we have in this theme of identity 
Lewis' response to the naturalist's denial of individual sub-
stantial unity, for Jane early on and eventually Mark, both 
assert their individuality. They both undergo material 
change and various hardships but they remain who they always 
were: somehow different, but still the same. As individuals 
they have persisted through the changes and their own self-
directed activity and striving. This fact contradicts the 
naturalist's denial of substantial unity in anything except 
the space-time process itself. 
The naturalist's denial of final causality or teleology 
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is also examined by Lewis and found wanting, for Lewis be-
lieved as do most people that this doctrine is inconsistent 
with our own intentional, purposive activity and striving--
something which the N.I.C.E. is not immune from either. 
Belbury's existence constituted that "grave danger hanging 
over the human race" that Ransom speaks of (p. 137). To 
achieve its goal of world domination it was ready and will-
ing to employ any means--including murder. Their continual 
striving is evident throughout the novel as they seek to 
keep Mark on board, enlist Jane's talents, and discover Mer-
lin's tomb. In their free time their subordinate activities 
include ghastly experiments, massive construction projects, 
the manipulation of the press, and the courting of influen-
tial figures to further their cause--while denying that 
teleology exists in nature or in man's life. This inconsis-
tency is masked by disguising the tendentious character of 
their utterances with unctuous double talk about the strug-
gle between obscurantism and order (p. 45). That knowledge 
can be teleological is evident by their incessant rumina-
tions over the best strategies to retain Mark's confidence 
or unlock the arsenal of powers supposedly possessed by the 
tramp. 
Though any notion of transcendent finality would be 
heretical to the naturalist view (because it would conflict 
with its atheism), the Belbury people are forever emitting 
religious locutions: "Oh my God," squeaks Curry; "good Hea-
vens," cries Fi.lostrato; "Hell's bells," growls Fairy; and 
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"God bless my Soul," croaks Wither. Here Lewis chides the 
modern theorists--it's almost impossible to strictly abide 
by naturalistic axioms. 
One of the major themes of the book is the question of 
human freedom and free will--which naturalism denies. Never-
theless the N.I.C.E. potentates are perpetually and mortally 
threatened by any expression of independent thought or ac-
tion. One recalls Fairy's timeless advice to Mark as she 
gnaws on her cheroot: "The great thing lS to do what you're 
told" (p. 118). Failure to follow this advice can come in 
the form of unsettling reprimands as the unfortunate Mr. 
Stone found out. The displeased deputy director informed 
him that "anything remotely resembling inquisitiveness on 
your part might have the most disastrous consequences" (p. 
3 09) • It becomes clear that it is far easier to deny human 
free will ln theory than it is to suppress it in reality. 
It has to be recognized and dealt with appropriately. Non-
recognition would be suicidal. Lewis here highlights our 
common experience of making and carrying out deliberate and 
sometimes difficult choices and of being responsible for at 
least some of our actions. 
The novel also contains illustrations of self-referen-
tial and logical inconsistencies, which further undermine 
naturalism's credibility in Lewis' opinion. Lewis writes in 
Miracles that "Reason is given before Nature and on Reason 
16 
our concept of Nature depends." However, according to na-
turalist theory reason has its source in nature and in our 
17 
physical processes. But obviously physical processes cannot 
be true or false, correct or incorrect, valid or invalid. 
On what basis then could one adduce the credibility of natu-
ralism? Lewis' main point here is that if reason is not 
valid then science cannot be valid either. But according to 
its charter the N.I.C.E. depends upon the fusion of the 
state with science. By exploiting th~ latest scientific 
discoveries it intends to "re-make" the human race. One of 
its more dreadful schemes involves the reduction of the phy-
sical aspect of people in order to make their "brains live 
with less and less body" (p. 211). But in their view the 
physical body is precisely what endows the brain with the 
capacity for conceptual thought. They might posit the 
theory of determinism as a kind of demurrer, but theories 
are constructed out of rational considerations not by ante-
cedent conditions. Hence, i£ determinism were true, all 
theories (including determinism and naturalism) would be im-
possible. 
The dialogue which takes place within Belbury invari-
ably reflects this sort of confused thought. A salient ex-
ample of this occurs when Wither gently corrects Mark's mis-
conceptions about Fairy Hardcastle's "technique": 
There are necessarily certain spheres--not sharply 
defined, or course, but inevitably revealing them-
selves in response to the environment and obedi-
ence to the indwelling ethos or dialectic of the 
whole--in which a confidence that involved the 
verbal interchange of facts would--er--would de-
feat its own end. (p. 255) 
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Evidently the notion of truth should not be allowed to in-
trude into any discussion. A not unpalatable axiom for Mark 
whose education has conditioned him to believe that there 
are two views on everything. The N.I.C.E., however, is very 
selective in its receptiveness to more than one point of 
view--organized religion, for example, is viewed as being 
nothing more than a primitive lie, designed to inhibit hu-
manity from realizing its full potential. Nevertheless, for 
them it continues to be a formidable opponent. And so it 
becomes necessary for Mark to repudiate any subconscious al-
legiance to it by stomping on a crucifix. Mark correctly 
reasons (using the naturalist theory of subjectivity) that 
such an act would be wholly gratuitous, before realizing 
that he has experienced ideas whose origin is not to be 
found inside his own body. 
Finally, Lewis reveals the inconsistency between the 
dogmas of naturalism and its rhetoric and polemics. The 
frequent references made concerning "compassion'' for human-
ity, the necessity of taking control of its destiny, and 
the desirability of "emancipating" it from the fetters of 
oppressive guilt are transparently cynical given the true 
nature and goals of the N.I.C.E. One need only recall 
Feverstone's contempt for his fellow drivers and the pedes-
trians while pontificating on his "concern" for humanity. 
19 
Or Jules, the literary pointman for the Belbury agenda, so-
liciting for the "rehabilitation" of retrogressive types and 
a new sexual openness. Clearly such shibboleths as the 
freedom and dignity of humankind and the obligation to con-
tribute to (or at least not hinder) human progress have no 
legitimacy whatever under the doctrine of naturalism--even 
at its humanist best. 
This apparent concern is strictly a sham if naturalism 
is true because according to that theory, persons are not 
individuals--possessing no substantial unity, much less a 
spiritual identity. Furthermore, they do not possess any 
freedom for this kind of humanism to defend, since every 
human's actions are fully determined. It is absurd for the 
naturalist to moralize about the rights of persons, their 
freedom and dignity, or their moral obligations. 
In addition to the inconsistencies of naturalism Lewis 
also abhorred its moral implications. If it is true that 
humanity adapts its morality to his general conception of 
the universe it is clear that modern morality will be dras-
tically different from that of the past. Lewis felt that 
because the modern person lacks an awareness of the natural 
moral order he or she becomes guilty of the sin of cosmic 
impiety, that is to say, of aspiring to a position in the 
universe which his or her status does not warrant. By re-
jecting all appeal to transcendence humanity accepts no 
model outside the human condition. 
Mircea Eliade, 
Thus, in the words of 
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Man makes himself, and he only makes himself com-
pletely in proportion as he desacralizes himself 
and the world. The sacred is the prime obstacle 
to his freedom. He will become himself only when 
he is totally demysticized. He will not be truly 
free until he has killed the last god. 17 
But Lewis also believed that the accomplishment of this goal 
must entail the stifling of man's deepest intuitions about 
himself. The most integral component of humanity's self-
definition--their dependency on God--must therefore be erad-
icated: hence, Professor Frost's endless chatter about the 
person becoming God and the necessity of Mark's repudiation 
of Christianity, even though he does not espouse it. The 
rejection of a creating and sustaining God, according to 
Philosopher Thomas Molnar, leaves ''the door .wide open to any 
substitute even if it is absurd or inhuman, but one not re-
quiring of man to recognize a supreme and personal being." 18 
Lewis portrays the desacralization of nature in several 
scenes in the novel; for example, Filostrato's desire for a 
world of "perfect purity." In his view the dignity of 
people is affronted by "birth and breeding and death" (p. 
212). By seeing these natural phenomena as unhygienic, he 
manages to turn human nature inside out. The New Man ac-
cording to his model would be an artificial man, free from 
nature. Other incidents of the propensity to desacralize 
nature can be seen in the Institute's defilement of the 
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River Wynd and the conversion of the river terrace into a 
dump. The levelling of Cure Hardy and the smashing of 
stained glass all serve as metaphors for the Institute's 
obsession to crush the creative and spiritual essence of 
the world around them, in the name of secular progress. 
Once nature has been totally subjugated and desacralized 
humankind can get on with the business of achieving its own 
destiny. 
To be sure (in the naturalist's view) there are-certain 
aspects about humanity which are not particularly commend-
able~-his origin (the results of blind force, chance, and 
emergence) ; his essence (basically inorganic matter) ; and 
t~e source of his behavior (wholly determined by the sys-
tem) . Nonetheless he still occupies the highest level of 
existence, the pinnacle of the universe. Obviously it be-
comes necessary for some kind of order to be imposed on the 
world, and this is when the Institute's doctrine of "man 
taking charge of man" enters the picture. A system of val-
ues must be created to justify whatever destiny they have in 
mind for the masses, and those values will be reflected in 
the various policies that are designed and implemented 
(either by consensus or by force). This is where Mark's 
talents come in handy--to manipulate public opinion. If 
that proves to be ineffectual then Fairy Hardcastle is wait-
ing in the wings with her shock troops. 
The individual person is caught somewhere in the middle 
of great expectancy and disillusionment. Lewis firmly 
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believed that the latter condition would ultimately prevail 
because mankind has only been deceived by the promises of 
progress. He would not deny for a second the astonishing 
scientific and material progress that has been made; but he 
knew that those advances alone would never satisfy man's 
deepest yearnings. They would, in the end, only render them 
more opaque. Adherence to the naturalist's doctrine of val-
ue founded on instinct further implies that those instincts 
can and should be gratified by society's material largesse. 
Consequently, we witness the spectacle of man submerging 
himself in titanic self-gratification and glorification. 
One unmistakable inference that can be drawn from That 
Hideous Strength is that Lewis believed that the tenets of 
naturalism saturate the institutions of Western Society. 
The effects of this condition, in his view, are both subtly 
and overtly pernicious. Primarily they tend to have a lev-
elling effect on society, inducing an "I'm as good as you 
are'' syndrome. Mass education, of which Mark was a product, 
dictates certain "approved" ways of looking at things. 
Lewis charges in The Abolition of Man that its principal 
targets are traditional moral values and cultivated senti-
ment: thus duty, courage, patriotism, chastity, and shame 
all come under attack. Curiously, however, the carefully 
selected values of naturalism are immune from the debunking 
process. Values are no longer based on moral rightness but 
on utilitarian and pragmatic considerations. Nations, 
classes, races, and civilizations are deemed more important 
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than individual persons because "the individual may live only 
t dd b t th l f • 11 19 seven y o years, u e group may ast or centurles. 
Education accommodates this doctrine with its underlying 
principle that man should be "cut out into some fresh shape 
at the will (which must, by hypothesis, be an arbitrary 
will) of some few lucky people in one lucky generation which 
has learned how to do it." 20 
The novel also implies that the success of the natural-
ist's campaign depends on its advocates occupying strategic 
positions in society, who all work in ~nison whether con-
sciously or not. Selected psychologists, social scientists, 
lawyers, and journalists are all officially sanctioned to 
effect a cure for a society viewed as a sick patient: Filo-
strato, Mark, Straik, and Jules endeavor to apply the latest 
scientific techniques to social problems, and society, it-
self, assumes a passive role with the proliferation of ex-
pertise. Lewis particularly indicts psychology and socio-
logy for their doctrines of repressions .and inhibitions, and 
their lack of sensitivity to human persons. He felt that 
applied psychology engenders "the notion that the sense of 
shame is a dangerous and mischievous thing," 21 and conse-
quently discards the reality of sin and further distorts any 
sense of objective value. If psychology undermines the be-
lief in objective value then those who hold objective values 
are mistaken and their belief has been irrational--the be-
lief that some courses of action are better than others; 
that good cannot be equated with what people happen to 
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approve of; and that if good is equated simply with desire 
then people are less likely to perform their duty (particu-
larly if it is disagreeable). Religion is then further dis-
credited. Dr. Paul Vitz, himself a psychologist, remarked 
that "religion is treated as a pathetic anachronism'' in most 
psychology circles, and that "people holding traditional re-
ligious views are considered fascist--authoritarian types."22 
Moral scruples can be dismissed as residue from a guilt-rid-
den childhood and conscience, generally, in the words of 
Professor Frost, "a hostile organism." 
The reality today of Lewis' characterization can be 
seen clearly in the words of C. B. Chisholm, one of the 
founders of the World Health Organization, as quoted by 
Christopher Lasch. The sentiment is very similar to Filo-
strata's. What is needed Chisholm said 
is the re-interpretation and eventual eradication 
of the concept of right and wrong, which has been 
the basis of child training; the substitution of 
intelligent and rational thinking for faith in the 
certainties of old people--these ought to become 
the goals of psychotherapy and of a psychiatrical-
ly oriented program of education. Only in this 
way could mental hygiene free the race from its 
crippling burden of good and evi1. 23 
I use this example to illustrate Lewis' contempt for the 
pretensions of the State to be any more than a necessary 
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evil; and it is difficult to talk about Lewis apart from his 
conclusions. He was also infuriated at the habit of social 
deference toward the intellectual classes that allowed no-
tions such as this one to hover in ~he air almost unchal-
lenged, and, in time, unnoticed. 
He also attacks sociologists and other ideologues who 
are concentrated into quasi-feudal power centers: the media, 
cultural pressure group~, etc. Mark, a sociologist, has ac-
quired "no exact knowledge," and his education ''had had the 
curious effect of making things that he read and wrote more 
real to him than things he saw" (p. 104). He was condition-
ed to see persons in the abstract terms of statistical data, 
preferring classes, populations, and vocational groups to 
individual, concrete men and women. The amorphous nature of 
his profession allows him the flexibility to write newspaper 
articles in defense of the Institute's public policies--a 
further insinuation that Lewis believed the proponents of 
modernism to be essentially identical. Their cynicism and 
hypocrisy Lewis exposes by having Mark manufacture ''copy" in 
advance of the events themselves--a not very subtle indict-
ment of the media. 
The ministers of culture get their licks too. Lewis 
portrays them as unwitting dupes for the real evil that lies 
behind the naturalist's doctrine. Jules, a popular science 
fiction writer and influential social theorist (supposedly 
representing H. G. Wells), embraces the ideals of the Insti-
tute, blind to the fact that he is a mere quisling in its 
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eyes. He bores them with his (by now) conventional clamor-
ing for a more "open" and "humane" morality. His brand of 
cerebral strategy, along with Mark's, has only limited sue-
cess, because the townspeople eventually erupt in violence, 
illustrating Ortega y Gasset's observation "the empty space 
left by the absence of public opinion is filled by brute 
24 force." This insight is borne out in the novel as Fairy's 
goons descend on the village and beat the people into sub-
mission. For Lewis this is the inevitable fate of modern 
man if the naturalist's worldview prevails. In the novel 
those who refuse submission are labelled as fanatics, fas-
cist, obstructionists, and die-hards. Later they are ap-
prehended for ''treatment." An appraisal of the Institute's 
derisive fury indicates that it is directed at something 
which they recognize as good and morally elevated. It is a 
form of resentment, which, according to Professor James 
Hitchcock, "is ultimately directed at the fact of morality 
itself, an authority outside the self by which the self is 
judged and, virtually always, found wanting." 25 
The subject of resentment brings me to Lewis' final 
critique of naturalism, which concerns the types of persons 
who are produced in a society drenched in its dogmas. Mark 
and Jane Studdock are representative individuals. In terms 
of the story, all of their flaws and anxieties are inextri-
cably bound with their denial or non-recognition of the ul-
timate reality and ground of their exis~ence, namely, God. 
Perhaps their most basic fault is their inadequate response 
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to commitment to each other. Both view their marriage with 
a certain degree of detachment and regard each other with 
cool affection bordering on outright disdain. Ostensibly 
they married for love but the "feeling" quickly dissipated. 
Jane is bored and preoccupied with herself--though precisely 
what she wishes to do with her life is unclear. Neverthe-
less, any notion of rearing a family is out of the question. 
The two of them spend remarkably little time together, pri-
marily because Mark is too busy ingratiating himself into 
the Progressive Element at Bracton and the Inner Ring at 
Belbury. He thinks of Jane only fleetingly and even then 
with a certain degree of ambivalence. There is no real bond 
in their marriage--which becomes self-evident as Jane flees 
to St. Anne's and Mark retires to the N.I.C.E. The break-up 
is beneficial, however, in that it helps them both establish 
their identity. 
Explicit in Lewis' wort is the idea that one of the 
worst things that can happen to a person--the most basic 
form of failure--is to not be himself. But to achieve self-
knowledge requires a courageous act of the will. Self-de-
ception, then, is a case of willed ignorance, due in large 
part to fear. Fear is the dominant emotion expressed by 
Mark throughout the novel, and is the efficient cause of 
Jane's surrender to the Company. Lewis attributes this kind 
of existential fear to the pervasive scepticism that has at-
tacked and destroyed not merely the outward forms of the re-
ligious spirit, but the very essence of that spirit--belief 
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in a meaningful and purposeful world. In such a world the 
predictable human response is that of detached cynicism, re-
sentment, and envy. 
Both Mark and Jane respond to the-Dimbles in this way. 
Mark cannot bear the accurate assessment made of him by Mr. 
Dimble, while Jane is outraged by Mother Dimble's "treating 
her like a child," and also by her piety. Mark's particular 
form of resentment, writes Hitchcock, is an example of "deny-
ing one-• s own moral culpability by calling attention to that 
of others, particularly one's accusers." 26 Jane's feelings 
of envy, malice, and resentment exemplify those "directed by 
the weak and impotent against those who appear nobler, and 
certainly more privileged, than themselves." 27 Later Jane 
re-evaluates her feelings and discovers that in truth the 
Dimbles "were the kind of people she liked" (p. 135). By 
casting aside her self-consciousness she was able to realize 
her own beauty, talents, and tastes. By the end of the no-
vel she has progressed from a jittery, suspicious young 
girl, to a poised and competent young woman with a mature 
and realistic outlook on the world. The Company succeeds in 
providing a context for her life that she had previously 
lacked. She has claimed victory over "self." 
Mark does not come around as quickly, but he has fur-
ther to go. Though superficially successful, Mark wallows 
in self-pity and self-deception. He craves approval like a 
child and is willing to compromise any belief in order to 
gain admittance into the coteries at Bracton and Belbury. 
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By his relentless calculating he is programmed for disillu-
sionment. Only after he has been repeatedly threatened and 
humiliated by Wither, Frost, and Fairy, realize~ the depth 
of their depravity, and resigned himself to the immanence of 
death, does he discover his own individual, incalculable 
worth. 
In this paper I have tried to show why C. S. Lewis 
found naturalism and its components to be intellectually 
barren and morally repugnant. He perceived its orthodoxies 
becoming more and more prevalent in modern society. That 
Hideous Strength imaginatively catalogues the forms of abuse 
that he felt would result from its complete domination of 
society. Because he profoundly disagreed with the desired 
ends of modern thought it is only to be expected that he 
would dispute the means of attaining them. 
For Lewis the purpose of man is simple: to love God 
and to love his fellow man. He insists on adherence to the 
moral law and the values which emanate from it: living our 
lives authentically in conformity with God's will and with 
a deep awareness of the universe as God's creature--imbued 
with his spiritual Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. 
He calls for revitalizing the spiritual depth inherent 
in love, marriage, family, and friendships; recapturing the 
satisfaction of meaningful work and the respite that can be 
experienced all around us in God's work of art. Perhaps 
living more simply and less pretentiously. But most painful 
of all--returning to God the love and respect which is due 
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Him--and surrendering our will to His. We must, according 
to Lewis, at all costs avoid the judgment found in Paul's 
letter to the Romans 1:20-23: 
for they are without excuse, seeing that creation, 
although they knew God they did not glorify him as 
God or give thanks, but became vain in their rea-
sonings, and their senseless minds have been dark-
ened. For while professing to be wise, they have 
become fools, and they have changed the glory of 
the incorruptible God for an image made like to 
'b 28 corruptl le man. 
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